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In this paper we analyze fiscal redistribution after the Great Recession. Are welfare states still 
effective in reducing income inequality? We use recent micro-data from the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS) to examine redistribution from transfers and income taxes, and the 
several underlying social programs that drive the changes in 31 countries. We employ a budget 
incidence simulation model to investigate to what extent several social transfers and income 
taxes reduce income inequality. This paper is a cross country comparison at one moment in 
time for as many countries as possible and for the most recent data year available. The study is 
novel because it offers an extensive decomposition of the redistributive effects of social 
transfer programs. In addition, we present sensitivity analyses, applying various measures of 
global inequality and different equivalence scale methods. Finally, this study offers a detailed 
analysis of fiscal redistribution for both the working-age population and the total population. 
On average we find that social transfers and income taxes reduce the Gini by 31 percent. In 
most countries pensions are a dominant factor. After performing a number of sensitivity 
analyses, we conclude that the redistributive impact of the welfare state is still substantial. 
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The overall tendency over the past two or three decades has been for an increase in income 
inequality in the large majority of rich nations. In OECD countries, the widening of the 
income gap between rich and poor has been mainly driven by greater inequality in market 
income from the mid-1980s (OECD, 2008, 2011 and 2015). Several explanations of income 
inequality have been introduced by researchers in sociology, economics, and political science.1 
One of the main driving forces behind disposable income distribution is the reduction of 
inequality through the tax-transfer system.2 The overall redistributive effect can be divided 
into redistribution by transfers and by taxes, or even into more details.3 In the mid-2000s, the 
average redistributive effect achieved by public cash transfers is twice as large as that achieved 
through household taxes, although for example the United States stands out for achieving a 
greater part of redistribution by taxes (Wang et al 2012 and 2014; OECD, 2008, 2011 and 
Whiteford, 2010). As the tax and transfer system was only able to offset a part of the rise in 
market income inequality over the last 25 years, disposable income (i.e. after taxes and social 
benefits) has also become more unequal in many countries. 
The growing interest in national and cross-national differences in earnings and income 
inequality has produced a wide range of studies. An important development has been the 
launching of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) in which microdata-sets from various 
countries have been "harmonized". LIS offers micro-data that are comparable, detailed and 
accurate. Specifically, LIS offers data on a large number of individual sources of income from 
both the private and public sectors (LIS, 2017). Consequently it is possible to study income 
inequality across countries and years (see Atkinson et al., 1995).  
In this paper we use the most recent LIS data to analyze fiscal redistribution after the Great 
Recession. Are welfare states still effective in reducing income inequality? On the one hand, 
some social transfers, notably unemployment benefits, work as automatic stabilizers and will 
increase in times of economic downturn. On the other hand, many countries have 
implemented retrenchments on social programs during the crisis in order to restore public 
finances.  
We focus on the effect of income taxes (including social contributions) and transfers in 
redistributing income. Our expectation is that social transfers are mainly directed to lower 
income groups, while income taxes are mainly paid by the rich, and therefore both will have 
an impact on income (re)distribution. We use the traditional budget incidence approach—
despite some methodological problems we will address— to study the combined effects of 
income taxes and transfers on the income (re)distribution. The distribution of market income 
is compared with the distribution of income after taxes and after social transfers. The change 
in summary measures of inequality between pre- and post-government income represents 
direct government redistribution.  
Many factors make it difficult to compare the redistributive effect of taxes and transfers across 
countries (differences in income concepts, the income units, (summary) measures, equivalence 
adjustments and other factors). Moreover, there are numerous possible ways to analyze the 
impact of taxes and transfers on the distribution of income; some of these approaches are listed 
                                                 
1  Among others Kuznets (1955), Nielsen & Alderson (1997), Gustafsson & Johansson (1999), Chevan & Stokes 
(2000), Atkinson (2015) and Piketty (2014). 
2  Among others Danziger et al. (1981), Gottschalk & Smeeding (1997 and 2000), Atkinson & Brandolini 
(2001), Smeeding (2000 and 2004), Atkinson (2003), Brandolini and Smeeding (2007), Belfield et al. (2017) 
and Caminada & Goudswaard (2001), Wang et al (2012 and 2014). 
3  Among others Plotnick (1984), Ferrarini & Nelson (2003), Kristjánsson (2011), Fuest et al. (2010), Jesuit & 
Mahler (2010, 2017), Causa & Hermansen (2017) and Caminada & Goudswaard (2001), Wang et al (2012 




in our references.4 It is generally agreed upon that there is no single 'correct' methodology. 
However, the budget incidence approach is - still - a standard methodology for studying the 
combined effects of all taxes and transfers on the magnitude of (re)distributing income.  
In this paper we elaborate on the work of Jesuit & Mahler (2010 and 2017), Mahler and Jesuit 
(2006), and Wang et al (2012 and 2014). We offer a user-friendly Leiden LIS Budget Incidence 
Fiscal Redistribution Dataset on Income inequality (Wang & Caminada, 2017). Also, we 
undertake a detailed study (compared to Wang et al, 2012 and 2014), containing a simulation 
approach which allows us to decompose income inequality through income taxes and several 
social transfers. It should be mentioned here that social transfers include public pensions. We 
employ a budget incidence simulation model to investigate to what extent several social 
transfers and income taxes reduce income inequality in 31 countries. Other recent studies in 
the field, Jesuit & Mahler (2017) and Causa & Hermansen (2017), analyze the trend of income 
inequality and fiscal redistribution. This paper is a cross country comparison at one moment 
in time for as many countries as possible and for the most recent data year available. The study 
is novel because it offers an extensive decomposition of the redistributive effects of social 
transfer programs. In addition, we present sensitivity analyses, applying various measures of 
global inequality and different equivalence scale methods. Finally, this study offers a detailed 
analysis of fiscal redistribution for both the working-age population and the total population.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we summarize literature on the redistributive 
effect of taxes and transfers in LIS countries. Section 3 presents our research method. Section 4 
provides a descriptive analysis of income inequality and redistribution across 31 countries 
around 2013. Section 5 presents the empirical results of our detailed decomposition of the 
redistributive effect of social transfers and income taxes across countries. Section 6 contains 
sensitivity analyses. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Income inequality and the redistributive effects of taxes and transfers across countries 
The relationship between income inequality and redistribution in a cross-country perspective 
is not crystal clear (see on this Lambert et al., 2010). A large number of articles discuss the 
relationship between income inequality and redistribution among countries. Despite recent 
empirical evidence suggesting that there is more redistribution when pre-tax income 
inequality is high, it is claimed by others that societies with low pre-tax income inequality 
redistribute more than less equal societies. The main reason for the confusion stems from 
differences in measurement strategies. Indeed, with three distributions involved (pre-tax-
transfer income, post-tax-transfer income, and the tax/benefit-system), and with different 
inequality measures to sum up these distributions, not surprisingly the literature offers a 
plethora of research methods and empirical results. Below we shall briefly review the main 
ones, restricting us to Gini-based literature and applications, which are by far the most 
prevalent. 
Several studies analyze income distribution across countries, indicating that the role of social 
programs (taxes and transfers) is important in the magnitude of income redistribution.5 Korpi 
& Palme (1998) use data from LIS to study different types of welfare states. They illustrate that 
both the level of transfers and the targeting to the poor are important for reducing income 
inequality. Bradley et al. (2003) divide the welfare states into three categories (Social 
Democratic, Christian Democratic and Liberal Democratic) to study government 
redistribution and distributive profiles of taxes and transfers. Their results indicate that 
                                                 
4  Among others, see Atkinson et al. (2001), Gustafsson & Johansson (1999) and Lambert et al. (2010). 
5  Among others, Atkinson (2003), Atkinson & Brandolini (2001), Brandolini & Smeeding (2007), Gottschalk & 




welfare generosity does not have a significant effect on pre-tax and pre-transfer income 
inequality, but increases the redistributive impact. By using LIS data for the mid-2000s, 
Pressman (2009) finds a larger proportion of middle-class households in countries with rather 
progressive national tax systems and relatively generous government spending programs. 
With respect to the relationship between inequality and redistribution, the results are not 
always in line with each other. Kenworthy & Pontusson (2005) examine the trend in market 
income inequality and redistribution in OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s, indicating 
that redistribution increased in most countries. Welfare state policies compensate for the rise 
in market income inequality across countries.  
A recent study by the OECD (Causa & Hermansen, 2017) concludes that redistribution 
through income taxes and cash transfers cushions income inequality on average by about 27 
percent in OECD countries. This effect would be larger when non cash transfers such as 
education and health care would be taken into account. Two thirds of the redistributive 
impact can be attributed to cash transfers and one third to income taxes. The OECD (2016) 
also finds that redistribution has weakened or stagnated since 2010 in most OECD countries, 
although there are exceptions. In countries that were hit hard by the crisis, like Greece, Spain 
and Portugal, redistribution has increased, despite fiscal consolidation measures, because most 
social transfers, e.g., unemployment benefits work as automatic stabilizers, and their purpose 
is to increase in the times of economic downturn. Jesuit & Mahler (2017) compare the 
redistributive effects of old-age pensions and transfers to those of working-age in 20 developed 
countries between the late 1960s and 2010. They find that there is substantial variation across 
countries in overall fiscal redistribution. Transfers account for the majority of the 
redistribution.       
Most studies focus on overall redistribution; others have examined in more detail the impact 
of income components on overall inequality (Jenkins, 1995; Lerman & Yitzhaki, 1985; 
Shorrocks, 1982; Fuest et al., 2010; Kristjánsson, 2011). Ferrarini & Nelson (2003) focus on the 
effects of taxation and social insurance in 10 countries around 1995, analyzing inter- and 
intra- country comparisons of income (re)distribution. Mahler & Jesuit (2006) divide 
government redistribution into several components: the redistributive effects from 
unemployment benefits, from pensions, and from taxes. They apply their empirical exercise 
for 13 countries with LIS-data around the years 1999/2000. Wang et al (2012 and 2014) 
update and extend the analyses of Mahler & Jesuit (2006) by taking into account many more 
benefits and taxes, and apply a budget incidence analysis to a wider range of 36 countries with 
LIS data up-to around 2004. They conclude that transfers account for 75 percent of 
redistribution, while direct taxes account for 25 percent. More than half of total redistribution 
owing to transfers is caused by pensions, although the redistributive character of pensions 
varies across countries. Unemployment benefits are the second important program in terms of 
redistribution, but their redistributive impact is only one fifth of the effect of pensions. 
Another finding of Mahler and Jesuit (2006) is that redistribution is more strongly related to 
the size of social benefits than to the extent to which benefits are targeted to lower income 
groups (targeting efficiency).    
Studies that apply tax-benefit instruments sequentially suggest that the redistributive effect of 
transfers is much more important than taxes (e.g. Jesuit & Mahler, 2017; Mahler & Jesuit, 
2006; Wang et al, 2012 and 2014). Few other studies comparing the redistributive effects of 
benefits and taxes simultaneously point in the same direction (e.g. Avram et al., 2014; 
Immervoll and Richardson, 2011; Joumard et al., 2012; Kenworthy, 2011). 
A number of studies are using the EUROMOD microsimulation model to analyze the 




policy reforms that have been implemented after the Great Recession. They find that the 
changes in direct taxes, pensions and cash benefits had broadly inequality-reducing effects, 
except in Germany. However, after including the VAT, the policy package appears to have 
been more regressive. Hills et al. (2014) point out that most of the structural policy changes, 
especially those introduced in the 2007-2011 crisis onset period, have inequality-increasing 
effects. Avram et al. (2014) analyze different types of policies in reducing income disparities. 
They conclude that pensions and direct taxes have the strongest impact on redistribution, 
despite low progressivity of these programs in some countries. Thus, the size of the programs 
matters more, than their targeting to lower income groups. As suggested by Figari & Paulus 
(2015), the overall redistributive effect of the tax-benefit systems heavily depends on the 
income concept concerned. They introduce an extended income concept, which also includes 
indirect taxes, imputed rent and in kind benefits. Applying this concept to three European 
countries (Belgium, Greece and the United Kingdom), they find that differences in 
redistribution across countries become smaller.  
 
 
3. Research method 
 
3.1 Measuring the redistributive effects of income taxes and social transfers 
Usually, the impact of social programs on income inequality is calculated in line with the work 
of Musgrave et al. (1974), i.e. statutory or budget incidence analysis. A standard analysis of the 
redistributive effect of taxes and income transfers is to compare pre-tax-transfer income 
inequality and post-tax-transfer income inequality (OECD 2008: p. 98). Our measure of the 
redistributive impact of social security on inequality is straightforwardly based on formulas 
developed by Kakwani (1986) and Ringen (1991): 
Redistribution by taxes and social transfers = market income inequality − disposable income inequality 
This formula is used to estimate the reduction in inequality produced by taxes and social 
transfers, where market income inequality is given by a summary statistic of pre-tax, pre-
transfer incomes and disposable income inequality is given by the same summary statistic of 
disposable equivalent incomes. Table 1 presents the framework of accounting income 
inequality and redistribution through various income sources. 
 
Table 1 The income inequality and redistribution accounting framework 
 
Income components Income inequality and redistributive effect 
Labor income + capital income + private transfers = 
Market income 
Income inequality before social  
transfers and taxes 
+ Social security transfers -/- Redistributive effect of social transfers 
= Gross income = Income inequality before taxes 
-/- Income taxes and social security contributions -/- Redistributive effect of taxes 
= Disposable income 
= Income inequality after social  





Of course, also critical literature on budget incidence analyses has emerged – but these criticisms 
leave the stylized conclusions intact; see a critical survey of efforts to measure budget incidence by 
Smolensky et al. (1987). The pre-transfer inequality is compared to the post-transfer inequality 
keeping all other things equal – namely, assuming unchanged household and labor market 
structures, thus disregarding any possible behavioral changes that the situation of absence of 
social transfers would involve. Kim (2001) shows that both the generosity and efficiency of the 
tax/transfer system may influence the level of pre-tax-transfer income inequality. In essence, 
budget incidence analyses assume that labor supply decisions in a situation with social 
transfers and social security are equal to a situation without social transfers. So, this standard 
approach biases the redistributive effect of generous and/or targeted welfare systems. Our 
estimates for redistribution through income taxes and transfers of each country should 
consequently be regarded as upper bounds.  
In order to assess the partial effects of specific social benefits and taxes on the overall 
redistribution, we apply a sequential accounting decomposition technique to the Gini. It 
should be noted, however, that this procedure is somewhat arbitrary since the choice of 
benchmark income affects the outcome. Applying the redistribution from, say, taxes on gross 
income rather than market income alters the outcome to some extent. Since taxes are levied 
on gross income (market income plus social benefits) as a rule in most countries, the 
redistributive effects may be underestimated. However, there are many differences in the tax 
treatment, between countries, between types of social benefits and in terms of tax instruments 
(tax exemptions,  preferred taxation, no tax). An extensive inventory and application of these 
particularities goes behind the scope of this study, but it should be noted that these differences 
in tax treatment will affect our results to some extent. Nevertheless, the logic of this 
decomposition of Gini is that taxes are applied to gross income and benefits to market income. 
This approach has been, among others, advocated by Kakwani (1986). 
Our sequential accounting decomposition approach of income inequality follows studies by 
Mahler & Jesuit (2006), Kristjánsson (2011) and Kammer et al (2012), with inequality indices 
accounted sequentially in order to determine the effective distributional impact of different 
income sources. Other techniques of the decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income 
source can be found in the literature as well; see e.g. Lerman & Yitzhaki (1985), Stark et al 
(1986), Kim (2000), Creedy & Ven (2001), but the sequential accounting approach is the most 
straightforward. 
Disentangling inequality by income source could be affected by the ordering effect. For 
example, the partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) 
when computed as the first (last) social program. The order of the calculations affects the 
results. We correct for this as follows: we first consider every specific social transfer as the first 
program to be added to market income and then the last program following all other transfer 
programs. Consequently, we get two Ginis. When we take the mean of the decomposition 
results across countries, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amount (a little) over 100 
percent due to missing observations. We rescaled the redistributive effects of each program by 
applying an adjustment factor to correct for this effect; see Caminada et al (2017a) for details. 
 
3.2 Data 
The LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg provides the largest available income 
database of harmonized microdata collected from 47 countries in Europe, North America, 
Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Australasia. Harmonized into a common framework, LIS 
datasets contain household- and person-level data labor income, capital income, social 




employment, and expenditures (LIS, 2017). The LIS database allows scholars to access the 
microdata, so that income inequality measures and fiscal redistribution (and the partial effect 
per social program) can be derived consistently from the underlying data at the individual and 
household level. 6 LIS micro data seems to be the best available data for describing how income 
inequality and the redistributive effects of taxes and transfers vary across countries (Nolan & 
Marx, 2009; Smeeding & Latner, 2015).  
However, country-comparative and trend analyses of income distribution based on LIS 
gross/net datasets should be done with caution (Gornick et al., 2013; Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2016)). LIS provides gross income data in most countries and years while providing income 
data that are net of (income) taxes in others. Of the 293 LIS datasets available at the time of 
writing, 194 are classified as gross, 84 as net and 15 as ‘mixed’; see Documentation Guide 
Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset on Income inequality (Wang & 
Caminada, 2017) for a specification. Since we are interested in the resdistributive effects of 
social transfers and income taxes and social contributions, this analysis only considers 31 LIS-
countries for which full tax-benefit information is available (classified by LIS as ‘gross’).7+8 
In the empirical literature, the selection of countries and data-years differs due to the 
consideration of data quality. From nearly 300 variables in the dataset, we choose those related 
to household income (all kinds of income sources), total number of persons in a household 
and household weight (in order to correct sample bias or non-sampling errors) to measure 
income inequality and the redistributive effect across countries. In line with LIS convention 
and the work of Mahler & Jesuit (2006) and Wang et al (2012), we have included households 
which report zero market income (i.e., all of their income is derived from the state) but have 
excluded households that report zero disposable income. 
 
3.3 Measurement issues 
The unit of analysis is an important issue in income distribution studies. It is evident that the 
ultimate source of concern is the welfare of the individual. However, an individual is often not 
the appropriate unit of analysis. E.g. children and spouses working at home do not have 
recorded income, but may nevertheless be enjoying a high standard of living as a result of 
income sharing with parents/spouses. How to solve the problem of the key question of the unit 
of analysis? 
Traditionally, studies have used household income per capita to adjust total incomes according 
to the number of persons in the household. In the last decades, equivalence scales have been 
widely used in the literature on income distribution (Figini, 1998). Equivalence scale elasticity 
                                                 
6  The distinctive feature and value-added of LIS is the access it provides to a set of harmonized micro data files 
supplied by participating statistical agencies at the country level (Ravallion (2015: p. 529): Harmonization of 
income data increases quality and comparability across nations and across time; see Smeeding & Latner 
(2015) for a critical review of three other popular data sets which summarize inequality across countries and 
years (World Development Indicators (‘WDI’)/‘PovcalNet’ and ‘All the Ginis’). Following Ravallion (2015: p. 
529): There are pros and cons of each source. While World Income Inequality Database (WIID) is the largest 
(by far) it is probably the least methodologically consistent internally, while LIS is the smallest but most 
consistent. PovcalNet and the WDI are somewhere between the two. 
7  The redistributive effect of taxes can not be calculated from net datasets of LIS, because gross income equals 
disposable income. Moreover, mixed datasets in LIS are a special case in which total income can be gross of 
income taxes but net of contributions, or vice versa, causing a bias in the calculation of the redistributive 
effect of ‘taxes’. As a result, we do not take into account the following LIS countries: Belgium, China, 
Colombia, Egypt, France, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Paraguay, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia and Uruguay. 
Moreover, we exclude Romania, because the latest data year available refers to 1997.  
8  In the LIS classification employers’ social contributions are included in the trajectory from market income to 
disposable income. However, Guillaud et al (2017) show that employers’ social contributions are (arbitrarily) 




for the LIS database is set around 0.5. This implies that where the income of a household of one 
person is 100, a household of two persons must have an income of 140 to have equivalent 
incomes. Alternatively an one-person household must have 70 percent of the total income of a 
two-person household to have equivalent income. In our comparative analysis we use this 
equivalence scale of LIS. However, it has been shown that the choice of equivalence scales affects 
international comparisons of income inequality. Alternative adjustment methods would affect 
the ranking of countries, although the broad pattern remains the same (Atkinson et al., 1995: 
52). As a robustness check, we apply two other equivalence scales methods as well; see section 
6.1. 
We have employed standard LIS top- and bottom-coding conventions, top-coding income at 10 
times the median of non-equivalized income and bottom-coding income at 1 percent of 
equivalized mean income. That is, income in the top of the distribution is cut off by ten times 
the median of the non-equivalized household income. Income at the bottom of the distribution 
is replaced by one percent of the average equivalized household income. The bottom coding is 
particularly relevant for households without market income. Without bottom-coding, these 
households would not be included in the calculation of the Gini coefficient of market income. 
On the other hand, these households would again be present in the calculation of the Gini 
coefficient on the basis of secondary income components as these households are entirely 
dependent on this. In other words, bottom-coding ensures that the calculations of the Gini 
coefficients are carried out over the same selection of households. Household weights are 
applied for calculation of Gini coefficients.  
Levels of inequality can be shown in several ways, e.g., by Lorenz curves, specific points on the 
percentile distribution (P10 or P90), decile ratios (P90/P10), and Gini coefficients or many 
other summary statistics of inequality. All (summary) statistics of inequality can be used to 
rank income inequality in LIS countries, but they do not always tell the same story. In this 
paper we mainly use the Gini coefficient, although a sensitivity analyses illustrates to what 
extent the empirical results for fiscal redistribution are affected by the choice of the global 
income inequality indicator (section 6.2).  
It should be noted that there have been controversial arguments regarding the issues in the 
measurement of income inequality. These arguments have their own merits and 
shortcomings, and there has been little professional consensus among researchers with regard 
to the theoretical superiority of a particular way of measuring inequality. We simply refer to a 
vast literature on the sensitivity of measured results to the choice of income definitions, 
inequality indices, appropriate equivalence scales, and other elements that may affect results in 
comparative research.9  
 
3.4 How to deal with pensions? 
An important choice in this kind of analysis is whether the total population should be covered 
or the working-age population only, an approach followed by Causa & Hermansen (2017).  A 
related choice is whether pensions should be earmarked as market income or as transfers and 
therefore pension contributions as taxes. This choice is of vital importance for the results. 
Most studies conclude that the redistributive effect of transfers is much more important than 
the redistributive effect of taxes; see section 2. But Guillaud et al (2017) show that if pensions 
are categorized as market income rather than transfers, tax redistribution dominates transfer 
redistribution in most countries. Restricting the analysis to the non-elderly would avoid some 
                                                 
9  Among others, see Atkinson (2003), Atkinson & Brandolini (2001), Brandolini & Smeeding (2007 and 2009) 




of the problems inherent to comparisons of incomes between people who are at different 
stages in their lives. For instance, an essential function of old-age pensions is to redistribute 
intertemporally over the life cycle; in that case a focus on the non-elderly helps in 
understanding the most important elements of interpersonal redistribution. However, we 
believe that in our analysis the largest government transfer program, public pensions, cannot 
be excluded.10 Public pension plans are generally seen as part of the safety net, generating large 
antipoverty effects. So, state old-age pension benefits will be included in our analysis on 
redistribution. But countries differ to a large extent in public versus private provision of their 
pensions (OECD, 2008: 120). Occupational and private pensions are not redistributive 
programs per se, although they too have a significant effect on redistribution when pre-tax-
transfer inequality and post-tax-transfer inequality are measured at one moment in time, 
particularly among the elderly. The standard approach treats contributions to government 
pensions as a tax that finances the retirement pensions paid out in the same year, while 
contributions to private pensions are effectively treated as a form of private consumption. 
This may affect international comparisons of redistribution effects of social transfers and taxes. 
We deal with this bias rather pragmatically by following the LIS Household Income Variables 
List: occupational and private pensions are earmarked and treated as social security transfers. 
Jesuit & Mahler (2017) also consider the pension system as whole, because the distinction 
between public and private pensions is somewhat artificial. For a substantial number of LIS 
countries it is impossible to disaggregate income from public and private schemes.  
Because the arguments for focusing on the working population are also valid, we will present 
an analysis for both the working-age population and the total population.  
 
4. Inequality and fiscal redistribution across LIS countries around 2013 
 
4.1 Inequality across countries 
This section reviews the evidence on cross national comparisons of annual disposable income 
inequality over 31 nations around 2013. Figure 1 shows the Gini coefficients. Countries are 
listed in order of their Gini of disposable income from smallest to largest. The obvious 
advantage of the presentation of inequality by summary statistics like the Gini coefficient is its 
ability to summarize several nations in one picture. Figure 1 indicates that a wide range of 
inequality exists across 31 LIS nations, with the nation with the highest inequality coefficient 
(South Africa) twice as high as the nations with the lowest coefficient (Nordic Countries). 
 
  
                                                 
10  For this reason Tony Atkinson has advised to take the total population into account in this analysis (LIS 




Figure 1 Disposable and market income inequality across 31 LIS countries around 2013 
 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
 
With respect to income inequality after social transfers and taxes, there are 22 countries with 
the Gini coefficient below average (0.33). Sweden, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Czech 
Republic, Finland, the Netherlands and Slovakia have rather low values below 0.275,  followed 
by other 13 countries (Austria, Luxembourg, Germany, Ireland, Switzerland, Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Poland, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and Greece) with Gini 
coefficients between 0.275 and 0.350. Above average inequality is found in 10 countries 
(Spain, Estonia, Israel, the United States, Guatemala, Brazil, Peru, Panama, Dominican 
Republic and South Africa). 
The pattern of market income inequality (before social transfers and taxes) is quite different 
from disposable income inequality. South Africa, Greece and Ireland have the highest level of 
market income inequality, with values above 0.55. Iceland, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
have rather low levels of market income inequality, below 0.40. The redistributive effects of 
taxes and social transfers differ considerably across countries. The highest level of 
redistribution is found in Ireland, Greece, Germany, Nordic Countries, Austria, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, while fiscal redistribution is rather small in Panama, 
Guatemala, South Korea, Peru, Taiwan, and Dominican Republic.  
 
4.2 The redistributive effect of taxes and transfers 
Figure 2 shows the overall redistribution across countries and the disaggregated effects of 
social transfers and taxes. Countries are listed in order of their total redistribution from largest 
to smallest. On average, the share of social transfers plays a major role of 76 percent in the 
total reduction of inequality, while taxes (income taxes and mandatory payroll taxes) account 






Figure 2 Redistributive effect of taxes and transfers across 31 LIS countries around 2013 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
 
Only in a few countries taxes are important in equalizing incomes: Guatemala, South Africa, 
Dominican Republic and Estonia. Generally speaking, redistribution of income in most 
countries relies to a large extent on social transfers. This relative effect of social transfers and 
taxes in total redistribution is presented in Figure 3 (countries are listed according to the 
reduction of income inequality by taxes).  
 
Figure 3 Relative redistributive effect of taxes and transfers across countries around 2013 
 
 







Note that the partial effect of taxes is negative for Taiwan and rather low for Switzerland and 
Poland. The rather low contribution of taxes in total fiscal redistribution for Switzerland is 
caused by tax competition that leads to income segregation into low tax cantons, which in 
turn leaves the overall income tax system less progressive or even regressive (Schmidheiny, 
2006). In this country it appears to be difficult to levy redistributive taxes from the rich and 
mobile persons. As a result the amount of taxes paid by rich people is relatively low. 
 
As discussed in section 3.4, the results of the analysis will depend on whether the focus is on 
the total population or the non-elderly people (those aged 18-64) only. To show this, Table 2 
summarizes the results for income inequality and fiscal redistribution among both the 
working-age population and the total population for 31 countries with full tax and benefit 
information. Both market income inequality and fiscal redistribution among the total 
population are – in all countries - higher compared to the working-age population (with the 
exception of Guatemala). In 19 out of 31 countries inequality of disposable income of the total 
population is higher compared to the working-age population. In both cases, the largest part 
of total fiscal redistribution comes from social transfers (as measured by the means of 31 
countries); 76 percent for the total population versus 66 percent for the working-age 
population, while the remainder of total fiscal redistribution can be attributed to direct taxes. 
Additional calculations show that the correlation between inequality of the total population 
versus the working-age population is rather high. The same holds for fiscal redistribution. 
Pearson Correlation is .86 and over, indicating that the choice of the coverage of the 
population does matter, but not to a large extent. We conclude that focusing on the total 





Table 2 Redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes around 2013 
 






Relative Fiscal Redistribution 
 Budget size  
transfers 





Relative Fiscal Redistribution 
 

















Australia 2010  0.477 0.330 31% 74% 26% 0.129 -0.318  0.414 0.313 25% 67% 33%  
Austria 2013  0.493 0.279 44% 80% 20% 0.261 0.045  0.417 0.280 33% 70% 30%  
Brazil 2013  0.542 0.450 17% 80% 20% 0.204 0.158  0.516 0.444 14% 74% 26%  
Canada 2010  0.481 0.317 34% 76% 24% 0.182 -0.066  0.432 0.322 26% 67% 33%  
Czech Rep 2013  0.457 0.258 44% 82% 18% 0.205 -0.198  0.375 0.255 32% 75% 25%  
Denmark 2013  0.476 0.249 48% 82% 18% 0.236 -0.199  0.402 0.250 38% 74% 26%  
Dominican Rep 2007  0.498 0.490 2% 55% 45% 0.028 0.026  0.490 0.483 1% 51% 49%  
Estonia 2013  0.540 0.352 35% 59% 41% 0.191 0.022  0.473 0.349 26% 44% 56%  
Finland 2013  0.487 0.259 47% 61% 39% 0.255 -0.033  0.408 0.260 36% 30% 70%  
Germany 2013  0.520 0.291 44% 77% 23% 0.224 -0.118  0.419 0.296 29% 62% 38%  
Greece 2013  0.567 0.332 41% 67% 33% 0.296 0.172  0.504 0.341 32% 54% 46%  
Guatemala 2014  0.427 0.394 8% 11% 89% 0.028 -0.039  0.430 0.398 7% 3% 97%  
Iceland 2010  0.393 0.245 38% 71% 29% 0.164 -0.125  0.347 0.245 29% 62% 38%  
Ireland 2010  0.564 0.294 48% 74% 26% 0.268 -0.087  0.517 0.294 43% 69% 31%  
Israel 2012  0.494 0.371 25% 68% 32% 0.148 0.010  0.458 0.359 22% 59% 41%  
Japan 2008  0.382 0.302 21% 76% 24% 0.149 -0.036  0.351 0.303 14% 59% 41%  
Luxembourg 2013  0.475 0.283 40% 82% 18% 0.260 0.106  0.416 0.283 32% 75% 25%  
Netherlands 2013  0.475 0.264 45% 72% 28% 0.222 -0.117  0.407 0.272 33% 58% 42%  
Norway 2013  0.446 0.248 44% 78% 22% 0.232 -0.064  0.391 0.258 34% 70% 30%  
Panama 2013  0.514 0.467 9% 69% 31% 0.116 0.111  0.488 0.455 7% 56% 44%  
Peru 2013  0.483 0.455 6% 63% 37% 0.073 0.131  0.460 0.438 5% 52% 48%  
Poland 2013  0.484 0.316 35% 100% 0% 0.255 0.068  0.442 0.319 28% 99% 1%  
Slovakia 2013  0.425 0.268 37% 88% 12% 0.209 -0.108  0.361 0.269 26% 85% 15%  
South Africa 2012  0.664 0.572 14% 42% 58% 0.106 0.193  0.636 0.571 10% 23% 77%  
South Korea 2012  0.337 0.306 9% 75% 25% 0.046 0.050  0.304 0.283 7% 68% 32%  
Spain 2013  0.52 0.343 34% 80% 20% 0.263 0.153  0.471 0.349 26% 72% 28%  
Sweden 2005  0.466 0.237 49% 84% 16% 0.281 -0.074  0.391 0.235 40% 76% 24%  
Switzerland 2013  0.425 0.295 31% 96% 4% 0.172 -0.144  0.346 0.285 18% 94% 6%  
Taiwan 2013  0.333 0.308 8% 115% -15% 0.099 0.077  0.308 0.296 4% 152% -52%  
UK 2013  0.537 0.33 39% 83% 17% 0.217 -0.123  0.459 0.335 27% 77% 23%  
USA 2013  0.509 0.377 26% 69% 31% 0.138 -0.091  0.464 0.374 19% 58% 42%  
Mean LIS-31  0.481 0.332 31% 76% 24% 0.182 -0.020  0.429 0.330 23% 66% 34%  
 




4.3 Redistribution, budget size and targeting 
Considering the redistributive effect of social benefits, scholars have distinguished between 
programs’ size and the extent to which they are targeted toward low-income groups by means-
testing. In a seminal paper by Korpi & Palme (1998: p. 663), they have posited a “paradox of 
redistribution” whereby “the more we target benefits to the poor . . . the less likely we are to 
reduce poverty and inequality.” The paradox arises from the fact that highly targeted 
programs have the support of a small and isolated political base. As they put it, targeted 
programs offer “no rational base for a coalition between those above and below the poverty 
line. In effect, the poverty line splits the working class and tends to generate coalitions between 
better-off workers and the middle class against the lower sections of the working class” (Korpi 
& Palme, 1998: p. 663). Comprehensive programs, on the other hand, even when they are 
organized according to social insurance principles, tend to encourage coalitions between the 
working and middle classes that leave low-income groups less isolated. 
With this background in mind, it is useful to explore empirically these two aspects of transfers. 
Is redistribution associated with transfers’ overall size or with their target efficiency? Is there, 
as is often suggested, a tradeoff between the two? Using LIS micro data it is possible to 
calculate a measure of the average value of social transfers as a percentage of households’ pre-
tax income (gross income): the larger the value, the greater the share of total income that 
derives from transfers. It is also possible to calculate a summary index of the degree to which 
transfers are targeted toward low-income groups. This is done by applying Kakwani’s (1986) 
‘index of concentration’ to transfers. This index takes on the value of -1.0 if the poorest person 
gets all transfer income, 0 if everybody gets an equal amount, and +1.0 if the richest person 
gets all transfer income (cf. Korpi & Palme, 1998: p. 684). Figures for the size and target 
efficiency of social benefits are reported in Table 2 and Figure 4; more details can be found in 
Caminada et al (2017) and Wang & Caminada (2017). As is shown, there is indeed 
considerable variance among developed countries in the average size of social benefits relative 
to total household income, ranging from 2.8% to 29.6%. Some countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Spain and Austria) achieve the highest budget size of transfers (above 26%), followed by 
twenty countries with values between 20% and 29%, while seven countries have the lowest 
levels (less than 10%). The budget size of the Unites States is far below-average (13.8% versus 
19.5%). 
As for target efficiency, it is more diverse across countries. Greece has a rather high budget size 
of transfers (29.6%), with transfer programs being slightly regressive in terms of the Kakwani 
index. Spain, Luxembourg and Poland have low target efficiency, but high social expenditures 
(above 25%). Australia and Switzerland show high figures for transfer targeting although with 
a modest budget size (less than 18%). The United States is one of the countries with both 
rather low social transfers and a quite low target efficiency. Interestingly, Australia, at the 







Figure 4 Redistribution, budget size and targeting across 31 LIS countries around 2013 
 
Panel (a) Panel (b) 
  
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
 
The budget size of transfers plays a very important role in overall redistribution, which is 
confirmed by a simple regression analysis in Figure 4 Panel (a). The estimated coefficient of 
the budget size is positive and statistically significant. Target efficiency is negatively associated 
with redistribution, although the linkage is weak (see Panel (b)). This is in line with the claim 
of Korpi & Palme (1998: p. 663) that greater use of transfer targeting yields less redistribution. 
However, it should be noted that our analysis is based on 31 LIS countries. When we restrict 
our analysis to the seventeen wealthiest countries of LIS, the correlation with target efficiency 
disappears (see Figure 5). Redistribution of incomes across countries does not correlate with 
the target efficiency. This is in line with recent work of Kenworthy (2011: 2-4). 
 
Figure 5 Redistribution, budget size and targeting across rich countries around 2013 
 
Panel (a)  Panel (b) 
 
 
Selected LIS-countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 




5.  Decomposition of redistributive effects of social transfers and taxes across LIS countries 
around 2013 
 
5.1 Budget size per social program 
This section provides detailed results of the redistributive effect of welfare state programs 
across a selection of our 31 countries based on the most recent wave of LIS. We elaborate on 
the work of Mahler & Jesuit (2006) and Wang et al (2012 and 2014). However, we refine the 
Fiscal Redistribution approach. LIS data allow us to decompose the trajectory of the Gini 
coefficient from market to disposable income inequality in several parts: we will distinguish 9 
different social benefits and income taxes and social contributions in our empirical 
investigation across countries. We calculate the following (partial) redistributive effects based 
on the LIS household income components list (see Documentation Guide Leiden LIS Budget 
Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset on Income inequality, Wang & Caminada, 2017): old-
age/disability/survivor transfers, sickness transfers, family/children transfers, education 
transfers, unemployment transfers, housing transfers, general/food/medical assistance 
transfers, other social security transfers, and income taxes and social security contributions.  
We explore empirically programs’ size and the progressiveness of each social benefit; see 
section 4.3. Table 3 presents social benefits as a proportion of households’ gross income for 
each benefit categorized in LIS. We selected 25 LIS countries for which full information is 
available on the whole trajectory from market income to disposable income for data year 
around 2013. 11 Countries are listed in order of their level of budget size from largest to 
smallest. 
We observe a considerable variance among developed countries in the average size of social 
benefits relative to total household income, ranging from 2.8% (Guatemala) to 29.6% 
(Greece). Some countries (Greece, Ireland, Spain, Austria, and Luxembourg) achieve the 
highest budget size of transfers (above 26%), followed by the majority of the countries with 
values between 20% and 26%, while 7 countries have the lowest level (less than 15%), among 
these the Unites States (13.8%). 
In most countries old-age/disability/survivor transfers account for 50 to 80 percent of total 
budget size. Family/children benefits account on average for 11 percent, unemployment 
compensation benefits for 5 percent and general/food/medical assistance benefits for 4 
percent. Rather small social programs are sickness benefits, education transfers and housing 
benefits, accounting each for on average less than 1 percent of the total budget size. Transfers 
not allocated to a specific category (the category Other transfers) are somewhat troublesome in 
our decomposition analysis. In most countries the category Other transfers is rather small 
(share below 5%), while in Australia, Guatemala and Israel it is above 10%. 
 
  
                                                 
11  This analysis excludes countries with little or no information on specific social benefits, i.e. when the 
redistributive effect of the category Other transfers amounts over 25 percent of total fiscal redistribution. This 






















Greece 2013 29.6 26.8 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.0   0.5 
Ireland 2010 26.8 11.5 1.4 5.7 0.1 6.1 0.8 0.3 0.8 
Spain 2013 26.3 19.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 5.8 0.0   0.5 
Austria 2013 26.1 19.8 0.4 3.5 0.2 1.7 0.1 0.3 0.0 
Luxembourg 2013 26.0 19.3 0.2 4.4 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.3 
Poland 2013 25.5 22.5   1.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.3 
Finland 2013 25.5 16.8 0.1 2.2 0.5 3.1 0.6 0.4 1.7 
Denmark 2013 23.6 15.5   1.5 1.3 1.6 0.8 1.9 0.9 
Norway 2013 23.2 16.3 2.3 2.6 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.6 
Germany 2013 22.4 16.8   3.1 0.3 1.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Netherlands 2013 22.2 16.4 0.4 1.3 0.5 1.7 0.5 1.0 0.5 
UK 2013 21.7 13.8 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.4 2.0 0.9 1.1 
Slovakia 2013 20.9 16.6 0.2 2.8 0.1 0.3     0.8 
Czech Rep 2013 20.5 16.4   1.7   0.4 0.4 0.4 1.3 
Brazil 2013 20.4 18.0       0.7   1.4 0.4 
Estonia 2013 19.1 13.5 0.7 3.9 0.1 0.5   0.1 0.0 
Switzerland 2013 17.2 12.9 0.0 2.0   0.9 0.0   1.3 
Iceland 2010 16.4 10.6 0.0 2.2 0.2 1.8 1.5 0.1 0.0 
Israel 2012 14.8 10.3   1.8   0.5   0.5 1.8 
USA 2013 13.8 11.0 0.1 1.3 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.1 
Australia 2010 12.9 7.0 0.0 3.4 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.0 1.3 
Panama 2013 11.6 9.4   0.3 1.5   0.0 0.4 0.0 
South Africa 2012 10.6 6.0   4.0         0.2 
Peru 2013 7.3 4.0   0.4 0.2   0.0 2.6 0.0 
Guatemala 2014 2.8 1.9     0.0     0.5 0.3 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
 
5.2 Fiscal redistribution per social program 
To illustrate the idea of decomposing disposable income inequality, Table 4 presents the 
results of our sequential accounting decomposition exercise for the mean of a selection of 25 
LIS countries with full tax/benefit information. Among these countries relative fiscal 
redistribution is on average 33 percent. 
Interestingly, only three programs account for 67 percent of total redistribution: old-
age/disability/survivor scheme (53%), social programs for family and children (8%) and the 
unemployment scheme (6%). Income taxes account for another 24 percent of total 
redistribution. Other social benefit programs and contributions seem to have a rather limited 
redistributive effect; together they account for only 9 percent of the reduction in income 






Table 4 Decomposition of disposable income inequality for 25 LIS countries around 2013 
 
  Gini   
(a) Gini market income 0.496   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.333   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.163   
    share 
Transfers 0.125 77% 
Old-age/Disability/Survivor transfers 0.087 53% 
Sickness transfers 0.002 1% 
Family/Children transfers 0.012 8% 
Education transfers 0.002 1% 
Unemployment transfers 0.010 6% 
Housing transfers 0.004 2% 
General/food/medical assistance transfers 0.005 3% 
Other transfers 0.003 2% 
      
Income taxes and social security contributions 0.039 24% 
      
Residual -0.001 -1% 
      
Overall redistribution 0.163 100% 
 
Notes: 
- When we take the mean of the decomposition results across countries, the sum of all partial redistributive 
effects amount (a little) over 100 percent due to missing observations. We rescale the redistributive effects of 
each social program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall redistribution given by 
formula (4) (=100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs (over 100%), in order 
to correct for an over-estimated effect. 
- LIS 25: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland,  Slovakia, South 
Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations 
 
 
In Table 5 we present the results of the decomposition of the trajectory of the Gini coefficient 
from market to disposable income inequality for groups of countries for the latest data year 
available in LIS. We clustered all countries in groups, among which English speaking 
countries, Continental European countries, Nordic countries, according to Esping-Anderson 





Table 5 Decomposition of income inequality and redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes (latest data year) 
 
















































                              
panel a: LIS English speaking countries                         
Australia 2010 0.477 0.330 0.147 31% 40% 0% 19% 0% 5% 1% 0% 7% 26% 0% 
Ireland 2010 0.564 0.294 0.270 48% 29% 3% 15% 0% 19% 3% 1% 2% 26% 0% 
United Kingdom 2013 0.537 0.330 0.207 39% 47% 0% 14% 0% 2% 11% 4% 5% 17% 0% 
United States 2013 0.509 0.377 0.132 26% 53% 0% 8% 2% 2% 1% 5% -1% 31% 0% 
                              
panel b: LIS Continental European countries                         
Austria 2013 0.493 0.279 0.215 44% 62% 1% 8% 1% 6% 1% 2% 0% 20% 0% 
Germany 2013 0.520 0.291 0.229 44% 61%   6% 1% 9% 1% 0% 0% 23% 0% 
Luxembourg 2013 0.475 0.283 0.192 40% 60% 0% 12% 0% 4% 1% 4% 1% 18% 0% 
Switzerland 2013 0.425 0.295 0.130 31% 77% 0% 6%   4% 0%   9% 4% 0% 
                              
panel c: LIS Nordic countries                           
Denmark 2013 0.476 0.249 0.226 48% 58%   2% 5% 4% 4% 8% 2% 18% -1% 
Finland 2013 0.487 0.259 0.228 47% 54% 0% 4% 2% 9% 3% 2% -4% 39% -9% 
Iceland 2010 0.393 0.245 0.149 38% 48% 0% 8% 0% 9% 5% 1% 0% 29% 0% 
Netherlands 2013 0.475 0.264 0.212 45% 56% 1% 3% 2% 4% 3% 6% 0% 28% -2% 
Norway 2013 0.446 0.248 0.198 44% 60% 4% 6% 1% 2% 1% 2% 2% 22% 0% 
                              
panel d: LIS Southern European countries                         
Greece 2013 0.567 0.332 0.235 41% 61% 0% 2% 0% 2% 0%   1% 33% 0% 
Spain 2013 0.520 0.343 0.177 34% 59% 1% 1% 1% 17% 0%   2% 20% 0% 
                              
panel e: LIS Central Eastern European countries                       
Czech Republic 2013 0.457 0.258 0.199 44% 69%   5%   1% 2% 2% 3% 18% 0% 
Estonia 2013 0.540 0.352 0.188 35% 53% 0% 4% 0% 1%   0% 0% 41% 0% 
Poland 2013 0.484 0.316 0.168 35% 86%   6% 0% 2% 1% 4% 1% 0% 0% 





Table 5 Decomposition of income inequality ….. (continued) 
















































                              
panel f: LIS BRICS                             
Brazil 2013 0.542 0.450 0.093 17% 61%       4%   15% 2% 20% -1% 
South Africa 2012 0.664 0.572 0.093 14% 24%   17%         -1% 58% 1% 
                              
panel g: Latin America                           
Guatemala 2014 0.427 0.394 0.034 8% -3%     1%     8% 6% 88% 0% 
Panama 2013 0.514 0.467 0.048 9% 33%   8% 21%   0% 8% 0% 31% 0% 
Peru 2013 0.483 0.455 0.028 6% 21%   16% 3%   0% 23% 0% 37% 0% 
                              
panel g: LIS others                             
Israel 2012 0.494 0.371 0.123 25% 45%   9%   2%   4% 9% 32% 0% 
                              
               
Mean-LIS 25 0.496 0.333 0.163 33% 53% 1% 8% 1% 6% 2% 3% 2% 24% -1% 
 
Notes: See below Table 4 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations. 
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In most countries two dominant income components account for above 80 percent of total 
reduction in income inequality: the old-age/disability/survivor scheme, and the income taxes. 
However, cross country differences are huge. For example, in Switzerland, Poland and 
Slovakia, old-age/disability/survivor schemes account for over 70 percent of income 
redistribution while in Ireland and Peru it contributes less than 30 percent. We even observe a 
negative impact in Guatemala.  
Large redistributive effects through income taxes and contributions can be found in most 
country groups (with the exception of the Continental European countries). The United 
Kingdom, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Denmark, Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia are 
special cases because the income taxes contribute for a relatively small part (below 20%) to the 
reduction of income inequality between market and disposable income. 
The redistributive effect of family/children benefits is relatively high in the English speaking 
Countries (8-19%), compared to Nordic Countries (2-8%), Continental European Countries 
(6-8% with the exception of Luxembourg), and Central Eastern European Countries (4-9%). 
Unemployment compensation benefits do have some effect too, especially in Continental 
European countries and Nordic countries. Remarkably, across countries all other social 
benefit programs appear to have rather limited redistributive effects. 
It should be noted that the results are hardly affected by the ordering effect. The partial 
redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) when computed as 
the first (last) social program; see section 3.1. Our analysis shows that the residual term is 
rather modest and in most cases below 2 percent (with an exception for Finland).  
 
 
 6 Sensitivity analyses 
 
6.1 Different equivalence scales methods  
Our figures on income inequality and fiscal redistribution may be influenced by the 
equivalence scales method applied. To test this sensitivity we apply three widely used 
equivalence scales methods: from LIS (this study), OECD modified, and OECD original. Table 
6 presents the results. Levels of income inequality and fiscal redistribution as measured by 
different equivalence scales methods hardly show differences. The measured fiscal 
redistribution ranges from 0.149 to 0.153 (means of 31 countries). Moreover, all equivalence 
scales methods show that by far the largest part of total fiscal redistribution comes from social 
transfers (share ranges from 76 to 77 percent), while taxes play a minor role (ranging from 23 
to 24 percent). Pearson Correlation of levels of income inequality and fiscal redistribution 
across all 31 countries for the three equivalence scales methods show values of .99 and over 




















LIS equivalence scale 0.481 0.332 0.149 76% 24% 
OECD modified 0.483 0.330 0.152 76% 24% 
OECD original 0.489 0.336 0.153 77% 23% 
Range (Max - Min) 0.008 0.005 0.004 1% 1% 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations. 
 
6.2 Different global income inequality indices  
It is well-known from the literature that levels of measured income inequality and fiscal 
redistribution depend on the global inequality indicator used. To test this sensitivity we apply 
five widely used indicators: Gini, Atkinson Coefficient (with e=0.5 and e = 1.0), Mean Log 
Deviation and Theil Coefficient. Of course, levels of income inequality and fiscal 
redistribution as measured by these indicators differ; see Table 7. The highest level of fiscal 
redistribution is measured by Mean Log Deviation and Atkinson Coefficient (e=1), while 
other indices produce rather comparable levels of fiscal redistribution. Moreover, all 
indicators show that by far the largest part of total fiscal redistribution comes from social 
transfers (share ranges from 76 to 92 percent), while taxes play a minor role (ranging from 8 
to 24 percent). 
Note, however, that Pearson Correlation of levels of income inequality across all 31 countries 
show values of .98 and over for disposable income, illustrating that our results do not seem to 
be very sensitive to the global income inequality indicator used. Pearson correlation of fiscal 
redistribution is .93 and over, while figures for market income inequality are somewhat lower 
(0.83 and over). Figure 6 illustrates fiscal redistribution as measured by five global indicator 
for 31 countries. Countries are ranked by the level of fiscal redistribution by the Gini’s. Note 
that other global indicators of inequality show a rather similar pattern (although levels of 
redistribution vary), i.e. the country ranking hardly alters, with an exception for Mean Log 
Deviation. We conclude that the levels of income inequality and the magnitude of fiscal 
redistribution indeed depend on the indicator used, but that both the country ranking of fiscal 
redistribution and the decomposition of fiscal redistribution (shares of transfers versus taxes) 




















Gini Coefficient 0.481 0.332 0.149 76% 24% 
Atkinson Coefficient (eps=0.5) 0.231 0.098 0.133 85% 15% 
Atkinson Coefficient (eps=1) 0.513 0.190 0.323 90% 10% 
Mean Log Deviation 0.751 0.217 0.534 92% 8% 
Theil Coefficient 0.426 0.207 0.219 79% 21% 
Range (Max - Min) 0.520 0.234 0.401 16% 16% 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations. 
 
 
Figure 6 Fiscal redistribution as measured by several inequality indicators (Total population) 
 
 
Source: Database Wang & Caminada (2017) based on LIS, and own calculations. 
 
7. Conclusion  
In this paper we have investigated the redistributive effect attributed to social transfers and 
taxes across 31 countries in the aftermath of the Great Recession, based on the micro 
household income data from LIS. We have provided market and disposable income 
inequality, total and disaggregated redistributions in a comparative way, across more countries 
than that have been studied before, offering an accurate, detailed picture of redistribution of 
incomes through taxes and transfers across countries. 
Nordic countries, Czech Republic and the Netherlands have the smallest income disparity, 
while Brazil, Peru, Panama, Dominican Republic, and South Africa have the largest. Nordic 
countries show the most equally distributed disposable incomes and market incomes. On 
average, large market income disparity exists in English speaking countries. Generally 
speaking, European countries achieve lower levels of income inequality than other countries.  
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With respect to redistributive effects, our budget incidence analysis indicates that the pattern 
is diverse across countries. The largest redistribution is found for Ireland, Greece, Germany, 
Nordic Countries, Austria and the Netherlands, while South Korea, Peru, Taiwan, and 
Dominican Republic show rather limited overall redistributive effects. On average for the 31 
countries, the share of social transfers in total redistribution is 76 percent, while income taxes 
account for 24 percent of redistribution. Thus, in most countries social transfers are the 
dominant instruments in reducing income inequality. We also find that this redistributive 
effect can almost fully be attributed to the budget size of transfers, while the extent to which 
benefits are targeted toward low income groups does not seem to play a significant role.   
As far as specific social programs are concerned, in most countries two dominant income 
components account for 50 to 80 percent of total reduction in income inequality: the public 
old-age pensions and the survivors schemes (including disability benefits), and the income 
taxes. However, cross country differences are huge. For example, in Continental European, 
Central Eastern European and Southern European Countries the public old-age and survivor 
benefits account for a large part of total redistribution, while these figures are much lower for 
English speaking Countries (29-53%), for Nordic Countries (48-60%). In Nordic Countries, 
English speaking Countries and Latin America income taxes play a major role (above 25%) 
compared to other countries (with the exceptions of the United Kingdom, Denmark and 
Norway).  The redistributive effect of social assistance (family and children benefits) is in the 
English speaking Countries relatively high (8-19%), compared to Nordic Countries (2-8%), 
Continental European Countries (6-12%), and Central Eastern European Countries (4-9%). 
In Nordic Countries also a variety of other social programs contribute to the reduction of 
inequality. Remarkably, across countries all other social benefit programs seem to have rather 
limited redistributive effects, although the food and medical assistance schemes do have some 
effect too. 
Altogether, we find for the 31 countries in this study that just after the crisis the mean of pre-
government Gini indices of income inequality was 0.496. After adding government transfers 
and deducting income taxes and social insurance contributions the Gini fell to 0.333, 
representing a Gini reduction of 14.9 points or 31 percent. We have performed several 
sensitivity analyses. Focusing on the working-age population only reduces redistribution from 
31 percent to 23 percent and also reduces the share of social transfers in redistribution, but not 
by much. Applying other equivalence scales methods hardly change the results. Using other 
global income inequality indicators affects the magnitude of fiscal redistribution, but does not 
have much influence on country rankings and on the decomposition of fiscal redistribution. 
The result for total redistribution is roughly equivalent to what Wang et al (2014) found for 
the mid 2000’s. Thus we can conclude that despite several budget cuts and reforms of social 
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